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Abstract: 
 
Iraq’s long and complex past has played a particularly poignant role in establishing 
and legitimating the various political movements that have ascended to power since 
the nation state was first created by the British in the early 1920s (Davis, 2005b). For 
example, the installed Hashemite monarchy that ruled Iraq until the 1958 revolution 
utilised their ancestral connection to the Prophet Muhammad to legitimate their claim 
of being the rightful legatees of the Arab lands, while later Saddam Hussein invoked 
the power of Iraq’s Mesopotamian past to build nationalism and unite the people 
against ancient enemies such as during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s.What is 
problematic about these examples of ‘historical memory’ in Iraq is that they have also 
been used to justify a series of autocratic and despotic regimes that have attempted to 
quash Iraq’s civil society and curtail any semblance of democratic reform. However, 
this paper argues that such ‘historical memories’ may well be useful in reinvigorating 
the Iraqi public sphere and enabling the transition from despotism to democracy. To 
do this, this paper focuses on the ancient Mesopotamian practise of ‘Primitive 
Democracy’ and argues that reinvigorating such histories may serve to legitimate and 
promote democratic governance within Iraq. 
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Introduction: 
 
It is only in relatively recent times that we have come to understand the historical 
importance and influence of the region known as Mesopotamia in the Ancient World 
and currently known as Iraq. Amongst these achievements are those of the early city-
states that developed across the region around 3200 BC. As is now commonly 
understood, this era witnessed the development of some of humankind’s earliest 
agricultural and architectural feats, including early farming practices and animal 
domestication, complex irrigation networks, sophisticated artistic and structural 
wonders as well as a relatively complex, urbane and cosmopolitan society. Very early 
on, these complex societies – with their large hydraulic projects and complicated 
temple and city economies - prompted the development of the world’s first written 
language (Frankfort, 1968: 49-50; Jacobsen, 1977 [1951]-a: 129; Van de Mieroop, 
1997: 36). This involved using a split reed to create the distinctive wedge-shaped 
marks now known as cuneiform on clay tablets (Greaves, Zaller, Cannistrano, & 
Murphey, 1997: 18) which evolved from early markings concerning systems of 
weight and measurement through to a rich body of literary texts (Pritchard, 1968; 
Silvestro, 1965).  
 
This rich and complex history of ancient Mesopotamia became politically significant 
even before the birth of the modern nation-state of Iraq in 1921, as various early Pan-
Arab and Iraqi nationalist groups utilised its symbology in their rhetoric to encourage 
unity amongst the ethnically diverse population (Davis, 2005b: 13). However, the 
efforts of these early political movements pale in comparison to the Ba’ath Party who 
underwent an extensive and sustained cultural campaign in which the successes of the 
ancient world became a symbol of Iraq’s potential as a united and prosperous state. 
Probably the most exhaustive study of the Ba’ath’s manipulation of Mesopotamian 
symbology and folklore is found in Amatzia Baram’s Culture, History and Ideology 
in the Formation of Ba’athist Iraq, 1968-1989 (Baram, 1991). Of particular centrality 
to Baram’s study is his critical analysis of the manipulation and utilisation of Iraq’s 
ancient Mesopotamian history by the Ba’ath in order to both encourage national unity 
and patriotism as well as to justify the party’s power. This is perhaps best evidenced 
by the launch of an extensive cultural campaign under the Ba’ath consisting of Iraqi 
folklore (such as music, folktales, poetry, dances and arts somehow linked to the early 
Near East), the funding of extensive archaeological excavations and museums as well 
as grandiose reconstructions (such as Saddam’s attempt to re-build Babylon in the late 
1980s) and the re-enactment of the ancient Mesopotamian spring festival across the 
nation (Baram, 1991; 1994: 302-303). His examination indicates the degree to which 
the Ba’ath understood the maintenance of hegemony via the manipulation of cultural 
and social artefacts to gain the consent of the people and maintain power.  
 
 
What is particularly problematic about these contemporary invocations of 
Mesopotamian history as a political tool is that, aside from its role in fostering some 
degree of national unity, it has also been used to justify the ruling hegemony of the 
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time via a vague connection to a long line of ‘Oriental despots’1. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by the grandiose murals and portraits that scattered Iraq in the time of 
Saddam Hussein in which he was frequently cast alongside infamous Mesopotamian 
kings such as Nebuchadnezzar in scenes riddled with ancient symbology and motifs. 
This is arguably due to the fact that, up until recently, the political history of the 
ancient Middle East had long been assumed to reveal a lineage of autocratic tyrants 
and the grand, menacing armies they gathered together in order to conquer and rule 
the region by fear, bloodshed and domination (Manglapus, 1987: 19). “In the 
traditional view of Historians,” as Daniel Bonneterre points out, “…Mesopotamia has 
stood out among the lost civilisations as a pessimistic world under the dark shadow of 
violence…[which] emphasised terror and ferocious actions” (Bonneterre, 1995: 11). 
The result of this understanding, which arguably dates back to ancient Greece, “…is a 
simplistic book image of the ancient Near East civilisations as naturally despotic and 
most savagely cruel” (Bonneterre, 1995: 11).  
 
So pervasive is this understanding of the ancient Middle East and its tendency to 
despotism that even journalists such as CNN’s Sandra Mackey, in a piece covering 
the career of Saddam Hussein in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, invoked 
several of the key assumptions about ‘Oriental despotism’ and its ancient origins by 
claiming that “The kings of Assyria never accepted the reality that empires, like 
modern states, survive only through a measure of consent by the governed. Like a 
series of ancient Saddam Husseins, each failed to lay the basis of a durable state” 
(Mackey, 2002: 37; as cited in: Mirzoeff, 2005: 22-23). This perceived connection 
between ancient Mesopotamian kings and the reign of Saddam Hussein seems here to 
offer further justification for the notion that Iraq is simply antithetical to democracy. 
Succinctly outlining this issue, Gareth Stansfield has recently observed that  
For many observers, Iraq is synonymous with dictatorship. Indeed, Iraq’s 
association with authoritarian and totalitarian methods of governance is so 
strong that it has been considered, by some commentators, that there exists 
some inherent trait within Iraqi society predisposing it to be managed by a 
‘strong man’ heading an all-pervasive, all-controlling, state. In supporting this 
line of argument, evidence from Iraq’s history and pre-history is often 
deployed, with notable examples of authoritarian leaders and seemingly 
aggressive peoples being used to contextualise modern Iraq as being not 
unusual when the wider sweep of Iraqi and Mesopotamian history is 
considered. The strictures placed upon Babylonian society by Hammurabi, the 
martial expertise of the Assyrians and the cruelty of the Mongols have all been 
referred to in order to illustrate that manifestations of authoritarianism in Iraq 
are, in fact, the norm. (Stansfield, 2007: 75) 
What is particularly problematic about this view is that the archaeological excavations 
and anthropological work done across the region throughout the nineteenth and 
                                                 
1 As has been demonstrated elsewhere by the author, the Occidental notion of ‘Oriental despotism’ is 
in fact a long-held and frequently invoked discourse which continues to impact Western understandings 
of contemporary political events in the Middle East, including the Iraqi elections of 2005 (Isakhan, 
2008). 
  4 
twentieth centuries have begun to uncover a very different image of the machinations 
of power and authority in the ancient Middle East. This has provided an 
understanding that the history of democratic politics, usually understood to have 
begun around 400 BC in Greece, can be traced further back to early Mesopotamia. As 
is illustrated in some detail below, this work has therefore inverted the traditional 
dialectic between ‘Western democracy’ and ‘Oriental despotism’ to instead provide 
evidence that  
When the Mesopotamian state first emerged in the early periods, royal power 
did not play an important role and only many centuries later did it become 
despotic. Originally kings were merely the first among equals and were 
obliged by laws or by long social traditions to respect the rights of the various 
groups of the population. In addition, royal power was restricted by popular 
assemblies which sometimes had a real and even decisive influence and which 
made citizens proud of their civil rights. (Dandamayev, 1995: 23) 
Building on earlier work by the author (Isakhan, 2006, 2007), this article argues that a 
more thorough understanding of the early political developments of ancient 
Mesopotamia might serve as a powerful ‘historical memory’ for Iraq’s contemporary 
political scene. By focusing on democratic movements indigenous to Iraq, such as that 
of ‘Primitive Democracy’, Iraq’s nascent democracy might better garner support for a 
genuine, inclusive and robust political future.  
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Ancient Iraq and ‘Primitive Democracy’  
 
According to Thorkild Jacobsen, the earliest signs of the crystallisation of 
Mesopotamian civilization at around the middle of the fourth millennium BC, include: 
the appearance of planned large-scale irrigation projects such as canals; a spectacular 
increase and density of population; and the emergence of the city-state (Jacobsen, 
1977 [1951]-a: 128). Concurrently, the Mesopotamian people also acquired “…the 
controlling framework within which Mesopotamia is to live its life, formulate its 
deepest questions, evaluate itself and evaluate the universe, for ages to come” 
(Jacobsen, 1977 [1951]-a: 128). Evidence for such advanced philosophical thought is 
found in the early myths and legends of Ancient Mesopotamia, where – in the ethereal 
plane of the gods we see the inner functioning of the ‘Ordained Assembly of the Great 
Gods’. This assembly was made up of 50 gods and goddesses2 in total and was the 
highest authority in the universe. As Min Suc Kee notes, this body served as “…a 
vital decision-making agency responsible for juridical judgements” (Kee, 2007: 259, n 
1), where the gods would listen and debate until the pros and cons of each issue were 
clarified and a virtual consensus emerged (Jacobsen, 1977 [1951]-a: 150). When the 
council reached a full agreement, the seven senior gods would announce the final 
verdict and each of the members would voice their approval with a ‘Let it be’ 
(Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 138). This unified command meant that the will of the 
assembly had become divine law. While this body largely served as the judicial court 
of the universe, passing judgement on the wrongdoings of gods and humans alike, the 
assembly was also vested with the authority to elect and depose the kings of both the 
divine and earthly realms (Jacobsen, 1976: 86-87; Mullen, 1980). 
 
Specifically, in the myth of creation, Enuma Elish, the gods form such an assembly in 
order to elect a leader or ‘champion of the gods’ who will defeat their powerful 
enemy, Tiamet, the primal mother. After some deliberation, the Ordained Assembly 
of the Great Gods elect Lord Marduk as the new king of the gods (Frankfort, 1978 
[1948]: 234-237; Jacobsen, 1976: 165-191; Roux, 1980: 109). Armed with an 
invincible weapon, Marduk was then able to smite Tiamet and, after returning home 
to a reception worthy of such a powerful and victorious god, Marduk set about 
creating the known universe including the first slaves, human beings, who were put 
on earth to do the bidding of the great gods.  
 
In much of his work, Jacobsen stated that such myths are a form of allegory whereby 
ancient humankind projected the world around them onto the realm of the gods 
(Jacobsen, 1970 [1943], 1970 [1957], 1976, 1977 [1951]-a, 1977 [1951]-b). This 
notion of myth is reinforced in the introduction to The Intellectual Adventure of 
Ancient Man, entitled ‘Myth and Reality’, where Henri Frankfort and H. A. Frankfort 
argue that myth “…is nothing less than a carefully chosen cloak for abstract thought. 
The imagery is inseparable from the thought. It represents the form in which the 
experience has become conscious” (Frankfort & Frankfort, 1977: 7). In this way, the 
                                                 
2 There is in fact some evidence to suggest that both genders played an active role in 
the deliberations of the gods (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 164; Saggs, 2004: 131; Wolf, 
1947: 100). 
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myths come to reveal more than the political machinations of the council of the great 
gods; at the very least they indicate just how long the will to democracy has been 
alive in human society and that “the egalitarian values of the primitive population 
were successfully translated into religious legend” (Manglapus, 2004). Beyond this, 
many have speculated that these myths also reveal the actual systems whereby ancient 
humankind governed itself. The general consensus is that in order for the people of 
Ancient Mesopotamia to have attributed such complex democratic systems to their 
gods, they must have experienced analogous assemblies themselves (Easton, 1970: 
82-83; Hallo & Simpson, 1971: 39; Schultz, 1981: 146; Wolf, 1947: 101).  
 
To describe these earthly versions of the divine assemblies, Jacobsen coined the term 
‘Primitive Democracy’ (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]). This political mechanism functioned 
more like a classical, participatory than a modern, representative form of democracy 
in the sense that it was 
…a form of government in which internal sovereignty resides in a large 
proportion of the governed, namely in all free adult male citizens without 
distinction of fortune or class. That sovereignty resides in these citizens 
implies that major decisions – such as the decision to undertake a war - are 
made with their consent, that these citizens constitute the supreme judicial 
authority in the state, and also that rulers and magistrates obtain their positions 
with, and ultimately derive their power from, that same consent. (Jacobsen, 
1970 [1943]: 157) 
Jacobsen also goes on to justify his use of the word ‘primitive’ to describe this early 
form of democracy, by stating that “…the various functions of government are as yet 
little specialized, the power structure is loose, and the machinery for social 
coordination by means of power is as yet imperfectly developed” (Jacobsen, 1970 
[1943]: 157). 
 
From what we know of these early days in Mesopotamian history, ‘Primitive 
Democracy’ seems to have functioned much like the aforementioned divine assembly. 
Although it was called together to make decision regarding matters as diverse as 
irrigation projects, trade missions, land surveying, administrative issues and to judge 
the serious offences of citizens, it was primarily assembled when the security of the 
city-state was under threat (Adams, 1994: 16; Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 138; Saggs, 
2004: 131). This formed the nucleus of the city-state’s municipal administration and 
allowed the collective resources of the community to be pooled in order to reach 
consensus for concerted action (Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 138; Oppenheim, 1964: 114; 
Schultz, 1981: 144). The counsel further mirrored that of the gods by functioning as a 
bicameral assembly in that it was divided between “…an upper house of ‘elders’ and 
a lower house of ‘men’” (Kramer, 1963: 74). Although the elder men or “fathers” 
seem to have held most of the power (Frankfort, 1978 [1948]: 215), some research 
suggests that these assemblies also resembled those of the gods in the fact that, 
“…women as well as men took part in decision-making – sometimes with a 
dominating role” (Saggs, 2004: 30). During an assembly each of the citizens had the 
right to express their opinion and discussion would continue until a virtual unanimity 
was reached and the final decisions were then announced by the elders. Just as the 
gods elected Marduk their king when under threat from Tiamet, so too did the early 
city-states of Mesopotamia convene for the specific purpose of electing a ‘king’ or 
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‘big man’ as it was called in the Ancient Near East (Kramer, 1963: 74) when the 
security of the city-state was under jeopardy, usually from threat of attack by a 
neighbour (Schultz, 1981: 144-145). Although this meant that the new ‘king’ became 
the supreme leader of the people and was able to “…promulgate and carry into effect 
new law” (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 158), the appointment was to be held for a limited 
term by each incumbent and expired when the pending emergency had been resolved 
(Frankfort, 1978 [1948]: 215; Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 167; 1970 [1957]: 139; 1977 
[1951]-a: 129).  
 
Fortunately, however, the arguably tenuous notion that earthly political processes 
were projected onto the realm of the gods and became myth is not the only evidence 
we have to support the view that Primitive Democracy existed in Ancient 
Mesopotamia. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, there have been 
numerous archaeological studies in the ancient Mesopotamian region, uncovering a 
fund of information about the early city-states and later empires of the region. Some 
of the earliest examples from amongst this body of data concern the extended Epic 
tales which “…reflect a period a century or two later than the myths, probably about 
2800-2700 BC” (Saggs, 2004: 131). These epics differ substantially from the earlier 
myths in that they centre “…around a human or semi-human hero, [such as] 
Enmerkar, Lugalbanda, Gilgamesh, etc. rather than around a god” (Jacobsen, 1970 
[1957]: 143). 
 
The most famous of these Ancient Mesopotamian epics is that of Gilgamesh 
(Jacobsen, 1976: 193-219; Storm, 2003: 62-99) which dates from around 2800 BC3. 
In this epic, we see a ruler who is “…scrupulously refraining from action in the matter 
of peace or war until he obtains the consent of the assembly in which, therefore, 
internal sovereignty of the state would seem to be vested” (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 
162). Uruk, the city of which Gilgamesh is ruler, is under threat from the armies of 
Kish. Instead of commanding the armies according to his will, Gilgamesh consults the 
bicameral congress of the city, which are striking in their similarity to those already 
discussed. First, he consults with the conservative council of the elders who appear to 
have been made up of the heads of the powerful families within the state (Evans, 
1958a: 11), who advise Gilgamesh against fighting the armies of Kish. However, 
Gilgamesh has the authority to veto their decision and appeal to a second assembly of 
all arms-bearing men (Braude, 2003: 7; Kramer, 1959: 29-31). This assembly decides 
to fight and Gilgamesh – despite the advice of the elders – goes into battle for the 
freedom and liberty of Uruk. In the Epic of Gilgamesh, we see, as Jacobsen 
concludes,  
…a state in which the ruler must lay his proposals before the people, first the 
elders, then the assembly of the townsmen, and obtain their consent, before he 
can act. In other words, the assembly appears to be the ultimate political 
authority. (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 163) 
Although there can be no doubt that the assemblies held at Uruk during the time of 
Gilgamesh were more primitive than those held in later Greece or Rome, they do 
                                                 
3 Although some evidence suggests that the tablets on which the story is written date 
from a period much later than when the events took place (Kramer, 1959: 3). 
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problematise the notion of ‘Oriental despotism’ in so far as they not only reveal a 
sophisticated political structure, but also a truly “…urban civilisation with a 
considerable period of settled life behind it”  (Evans, 1958a: 11). In fact, as Kramer 
points out, the situation that brought about the convening of Uruk’s bicameral 
assemblies is not dissimilar to the one that ancient Greece faced some 2400 years later 
(Kramer, 1959: 30-31). Sumer, like Greece, was made up of a number of independent 
city-states, each of them vying for power and supremacy over the region and its 
people. In a reversal of the veto power that the assembly of the arms-bearing men had 
over the elders in Uruk, the Spartan elders (a council of twenty-eight men, all over 
sixty years of age) had the power to overrule any ‘crooked decree’ that was passed by 
the popular assembly (Evans, 1958a: 4). Indeed, further parallels can be drawn 
between the Epic of Gilgamesh and the deliberative practices of the Roman Republic 
in the prelude to their war against Carthage (around 265 BC). Here, the senate refused 
to authorise the war and therefore the consuls summoned the Comitia Centuriata, or 
military assembly, which gave the final approval for war (Easton, 1970: 83 n1). 
 
Over time, however, the deliberative and direct forms of democracy revealed by epics 
such as Gilgamesh began to fade for several different reasons. Firstly, the city-states 
of the Ancient Near East grew in terms of both population and geographical size. This 
meant that not only was it difficult for all citizens to physically reach the assembly on 
a regular basis, but it also became harder for the people to come to consensus 
(Frankfort, 1978 [1948]: 215; Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 146). With this increase in 
population came a second factor in the dissolution of democracy across Mesopotamia: 
a corresponding increase in battles to determine control of key irrigated land and trade 
routes (Saggs, 2004: 131). Unfortunately, this occasional warfare quickly descended 
into a bloody and bitter state of cyclical violence (Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 143). This 
meant that military leadership was urgent and needed to be relatively consistent in 
order to maintain the necessary strategies and defences (Frankfort, 1978 [1948]: 218; 
Kramer, 1963: 74; Saggs, 2004: 131-132). In this way, those who were elected to 
kingship became disinclined to abdicate their position (Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 142; 
Saggs, 2004: 132; Schultz, 1981: 145). Not only was the king the supreme 
commander of the military, the sole creator of new laws and very wealthy as the 
administrator of the temple, but he4 was also too often the victim of his own 
megalomaniacal lust, “…striving to become the one who would unite all of southern 
Mesopotamia into a single centralized state under a single ruling hand – his own” 
(Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]: 158). As is noted by Evans, “…the presence of an external 
threat is always a good excuse for the abridgement of liberty” (Evans, 1958a: 2). 
Finally, the kings began to “…seek a more independent and more stable basis for their 
power than that of popular favour and election in the popular assembly; divine favour 
and election were stressed instead” (Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 145). Ironically, the kings 
were therefore able to forego the democratic process here on earth by claiming that 
they had been elected by the auspicious Council of the Gods. This meant that the 
kings were directly accountable to the gods, not to their fellow citizens, thus allowing 
them to establish their own despotic dynasties (Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 149-150). In 
this way, kingship developed from the temporary role of an everyday citizen, to the 
                                                 
4 In the interest of political correctness, it is worth noting that to the best knowledge 
of the author the supreme ruler during this era of Mesopotamian history was always a 
‘he’. 
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more familiar system whereby a particular blood lineage has the blessing of the divine 
(Kramer, 1963: 74). This model was gradually adopted across Mesopotamia, giving 
birth to vast empires such as that of the Assyrians, who arguably laid the foundations 
for first the Persian, and later the Hellenistic and Roman empires (Jacobsen, 1970 
[1957]: 156). 
 
Once again however, democracy – in one guise or another – seems to have survived 
this early political shift towards despotism. Although there was no doubting that the 
king held the supreme authority of the state, there are a number of examples whereby 
the long tradition of assemblies continued throughout Mesopotamia and further 
abroad. One such example is the extended kingdom of Ebla, the remains of which can 
be found today in north-western Syria. According to Raul S. Manglapus, excavations 
in 1976 revealed astonishing details about this kingdom of some 250,000 people, 
which had flourished in the East around 2500 BC. The “…15,000 clay tablets or 
fragments written in Sumerian cuneiform” that were unearthed by archaeologists, 
exposed a sophisticated political culture involving some 11,000 public servants 
(Manglapus, 2004; Springborg, 1992: 8). According to their law, the king of Ebla was 
“…elected for a seven-year term and shared power with a council of elders” 
(Manglapus, 2004). Then, after serving his first term, the incumbent was entitled to 
run for a second and, in the event that he was not re-elected to office, the former king 
was able to retire on a state pension! (For more details on Ebla, see: Bermant & 
Weitzman, 1979; Matthiae, 1980.) 
 
Geographically closer to the early developments of Mesopotamia already discussed, 
the people of Kish (very near to ancient Babylon) held a general election to nominate 
their king around 2300 BC. This particular king even took the “…throne-name Iphur-
kish (‘Kish assembled’) to emphasise the popular basis of his rule” (Saggs, 2004: 132)  
(see also: Frankfort, 1978 [1948]: 218). At around the same time, the people of 
Lagash (which is further south, closer to the coastline of lower Mesopotamia) were 
embroiled in an early struggle against the upsurge of despotic regimes. It seems as if 
the power of the throne had seduced the authorities of Lagash to the point of 
bloodthirsty megalomania and that they were prepared to deny their citizens the basic 
political, social and economic freedoms that one generally expects from a free state. It 
is here in Lagash, according to Samuel Noah Kramer, that we see a “…bitter struggle 
for power between the temple and the palace – the ‘church’ and the ‘state’ – with the 
citizens of Lagash taking the side of the temple” (Kramer, 1963: 79). In Early 
Dynastic states such as Lagash, the temple community wielded enormous political 
power and “…showed a strongly democratic character” (Frankfort, 1978 [1948]: 221). 
Not only were all citizens of the state – irrespective of their status or wealth – 
expected to contribute their labour to the maintenance and harvest of temple land, but 
the authorities of the temple fulfilled a vital watchdog function over the government, 
monitoring instances of corruption and other abuses of power (Frankfort, 1978 
[1948]: 221-223). The extent of the temples’ role in balancing the authority of the 
state is evident in the role that it played in generating and advocating resistance 
amongst the people of Lagash towards state-imposed terror and despotism. So 
significant was this movement that it is here we find some of the earliest evidence of 
collective political action against oppressive systems of power and the first recorded 
use of the word “freedom” (Kramer, 1963: 79). 
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In the central Babylonian plain, approximately half-way between Lagash in the south 
and Kish in the north, the people of Nippur had long been familiar with the practises 
of ‘Primitive Democracy’. It was here, according to Jacobsen, that the various rulers 
of the city-states of Mesopotamia had met in assemblies similar to those already 
discussed for the purpose of debating and resolving broader regional issues and 
conflicts as well as the election of a temporary king to rule over the collective states 
under the confederacy known as the ‘Kengir League’5 (Jacobsen, 1970 [1957]: 139-
140). Here, the leaders of the early city-states of Mesopotamia demonstrate an 
extraordinarily advanced political culture where the differences and disputes between 
the city-states were either resolved or rendered superfluous in the face of common 
issues such as those which required the decisive action that only a sole leader could 
implement. While it would seem that the political climate of Nippur might tempt the 
more ambitious members of the society to overthrow such isonomous models of 
governance, the city managed to preserve its democratic tendencies well into the Ur 
III period (around 2150-2000 BC). While many of Nippur’s neighbours had since 
witnessed the rise of a centralised authority under the blood-line of a particular king, 
Nippur remained “…governed by a heterogenous collective, the assembly of Nippur 
citizens, the governor (Ensi) of the city, and the highest priests of the Enlil and 
Ninurta temples” (Leick, 2001: 159). 
 
Similarly, in the north of Mesopotamian, the citizens off Sippar (some 20 kilometres 
south of modern Baghdad) managed to retain models of collective governance until 
surprisingly late periods. For example, from approximately 1890-1590 BC, the city 
appears to have been governed by a bicameral assembly made up of an upper house of 
nobility and a lower house of commoners (Oppenheim, 1969: 9-10). Here, the upper 
house consisted of the more senior, qualified and wealthy members of the society who 
rotated leadership of the various magisterial and administrative positions on an annual 
basis. Unfortunately, as the city of Sippar came under the jurisdiction of the central 
Babylonian government, the elite citizens who made up the upper house were 
gradually infiltrated by royally appointed officials (Leick, 2001: 176). Here, the 
emphasis shifted further away from the original impetus of serving the citizens 
towards the role of a mediating body between the authority of the king and the 
subjugation of Sippar. However, even in this situation the upper house retained its 
judicial role and presided over the affairs of the state with the rights of the citizen 
extended to the request of a royal verdict should a particular case require a higher 
body to exact justice (Leick, 2001: 176).  
 
More generally, the grand empires of the time – namely, the Babylonian and the 
Assyrian – also appear to have had democratic tendencies despite the common 
misconception that they were the very epitome of “Oriental despotism”. The 
Babylonian kings, for example, would often delegate the judicial duty of settling 
minor disputes to the  “…town mayor and town elders” (Manglapus, 2004). However, 
the more important and complex cases were brought before the whole town in the 
form of an assembly which tried both civil and criminal cases and had the power to 
issue the death sentence, with their final decision being “…ceremonially confirmed by 
the king” (Manglapus, 2004). As Jacobsen points out, this judicial system is 
democratic in nature, with the major decisions over right and wrong or life and death 
                                                 
5 ‘Kengir’ is the Sumerian word for the Mesopotamian region. 
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vested in the assembly, a forum open to the entire community of citizens (Jacobsen, 
1970 [1943]: 159-163).  
 
The population of the Assyrian capital, Ashur, were able to congregate in an assembly 
which reached agreement under the guidance of the more senior, wealthy and 
influential members of the community. Knowing all too well the popularity and 
power of the elders to influence the wider community of citizens, the kings of Assyria 
were “…always careful not to offend their high administrative officials, whose loyalty 
to the dynasty they at times had to secure by oaths and agreements” (Oppenheim, 
1964: 103). When differences of opinion between the king and the elders did occur, 
they “…were quite ready to revolt against the king if they did not approve of his 
policies” (Oppenheim, 1964: 103), taking their case to the people. In particularly 
serious matters, the elders would convene an assembly of the free citizens and work 
with them in writing a letter addressed to the king (Oppenheim, 1964: 12). In this 
way, the citizens of Ashur were able to fight for exemptions and privileges, “…make 
legal decisions, sell real estate within the city that had no private owner, and assume 
corporate responsibility in cases of murder or robbery committed even outside the 
city, within a specified distance” (Oppenheim, 1964: 12). 
 
In addition, the power of the Assyrian elders can be seen in the fact that the king was 
not able to directly appoint his own successor, but instead he nominated a potential 
heir who was then subject to the consent of the council (Oppenheim, 1964: 103)6. 
More broadly, the power of the state was also mitigated against a thriving private 
sector as the merchants of the Assyrian empire grew in wealth and, subsequently, in 
influence. The great merchant families appear to have convened in a building 
commonly known as the ‘city house’ where they “…made decisions on commercial 
policy, fixed the rates of export tax…acted as a diplomatic body…and controlled 
relations with Anatolian rulers on whose cooperation and protection the caravans and 
resident merchants relied” (Leick, 2001: 203). From among this body of wealthy 
merchants, one member was chosen by lot annually to serve as the chairman of the 
board. This individual was conferred with the highest honours underneath the 
authority of the king and “…was responsible for public works, for overseeing the 
judiciary, and took a leading part in the city’s religious and ceremonial rites” (Leick, 
2001: 203).  
 
Speaking generally about the democratic developments across Mesopotamia during 
the time of the Babylonian and Assyrian empires, Schemeil notes that “…historical 
documents describe assemblies of citizens deliberating for days, each session 
including new members” (Schemeil, 2000: 104). It appears that due to the size of the 
community it was often hard to garner consensus and therefore the circle of delegates 
became wider as deliberations continued, often involving commoners, teenagers and 
women. At every stage, the assemblies appear to have been lively places, with 
participants openly pointing out the contradictions and inconsistencies in their 
opponents’ arguments. When each of the participants had been given a chance to state 
their case at least once, the proceedings ended before debate became cyclical, 
emotional or counter-productive. When the time came for the citizens to vote, they 
                                                 
6 For more on the complex laws governing ancient Assyria, see The Assyrian Laws 
(Driver & Miles, 1935). 
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did so by either kneeling or walking to the speaker to approve or by sitting to 
disapprove (Larsen, 1976: 323; Moran, 1992: 401-402, n24). Although “…majority 
votes were often sought and reached…it was always possible that minority views 
would raise the problem again if its legal solution was a failure” (Schemeil, 2000: 
104). Similar to the Ordained Assembly of the Great Gods, the proceedings of these 
later assemblies were concluded by the chair sternly pronouncing ‘Let it be’. 
 
Apart from these examples where democratic practices formed part of the centralised 
authority of the major empires of the Ancient Near East, one also finds examples from 
across their colonies. Kanesh, one of the outlying merchant colonies of the Assyrian 
empire, serves as a near perfect case study. With archaeologists uncovering some 
16,000 cuneiform tablets in, a picture of Kanesh’s thriving economic and trade 
systems began to emerge (Leick, 2001: 199). Located today in Turkey’s Cappadocia 
region, Kanesh flourished from around 2000-1800 BC (Saggs, 2004: 416) with 
evidence suggesting that a number of Assyrians moved there, purchased land and 
settled for long periods. Here, Geoffrey Evans (Evans, 1958a) finds parallels between 
the governmental machinations employed in Kanesh, and those used by the people of 
Uruk during the time of Gilgamesh – some 800-1000 years earlier. Although he 
rightly points out that there were a number of significant changes7, he does go on to 
state that “…the assemblies of Kanesh remain of the first importance historically. 
They possess features similar to the earlier ones, and we possess a little more 
information about the manner in which they operated” (Evans, 1958a: 4). 
 
It appears that because these remote and generally wealthy citizens of the Assyrian 
empire preferred their governance to be closer to home, they were able to retain 
significant autonomy until surprisingly late periods. The more successful and 
influential among them formed the council of the elders and there can be no doubt 
that oligarchic and expedient tendencies emerged within the group. Although they 
remained the subjects of the king and therefore subscribed to his law, the elders 
presided over many domestic issues, including both political and judicial decision 
making (Evans, 1958a: 3; Manglapus, 2004). In these assemblies, there appear to have 
been rather advanced forms of voting whereby the congregation would divide into 
three groups and each group would deliberate and vote independently before 
reconvening in a plenary where the final votes were counted (Larsen, 1976: 319-323; 
Schemeil, 2000: 104). However, when the elders failed to agree, matters were brought 
before the full assembly of all adult males (Evans, 1958a: 9, 11), which was “… 
called into session by a clerk at the bidding of a majority of [the elders]” (Jacobsen, 
1970 [1943]: 159). There is also evidence to suggest that once this assembly had 
convened, the citizenry of Kanesh also voted, although perhaps in a far less 
sophisticated manner than was practised by the elders. What is certain is that beyond 
the deliberations of the assembly was a civic culture and a complex bureaucracy that 
extended out into the social world of the ancient Middle East where citizens further 
discussed and debated social issues, often forming loose political alliances (Larsen, 
                                                 
7 These changes included that the volume of public concerns directly under the 
assemblies’ control had diminished, the majority of assemblies were made up only of 
elders and that the elders themselves had changed from wise heads of families to 
wealthy officials and merchants. 
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1976: 161-170)  (see also the contributions in: Gibson & Biggs, 1987). Although 
Evans (Evans, 1958a) is initially reluctant to cite these practices as democratic, in an 
addendum published later the same year he concedes that the various democratic 
procedures practised in Kanesh at the very least “…strongly suggest a liberal and 
democratic spirit among this small group of local dignitaries. In such an atmosphere, 
democratic procedures within the group might easily arise” (Evans, 1958b: 114-115). 
 
En route between Ashur and Kanesh, caravans of traders, individual travellers and the 
messengers of the Assyrian empire passed through Mari (Saggs, 2004: 218). A much 
smaller empire that came to prosperity after the turn of the second millennium BC, 
Mari dominated that part of the western Euphrates that now falls just inside Syria’s 
modern border with Iraq (the city of Mari is now known as Tell Hariri) (Saggs, 2004: 
63-64). The ancient city of Mari was excavated by French archaeologists from 1933 
onwards uncovering, amongst other things, “…an archive of over twenty thousand 
cuneiform tablets, mainly administrative and economic documents and letters” 
(Saggs, 2004: 64). It is these clay tablets that Fleming has claimed provide the 
“…ideal resource for the study of many aspects of ancient political life” (Fleming, 
2004: 19). In Mari, as in Kanesh, there seem to have been few who would openly and 
directly challenge the authority of the king. However, Mari kingship was not the 
simple ‘Oriental despotism’ that is so often supposed of Near Eastern authority, but 
instead “…actual power seems to be a matter of constant negotiation, as he [the king] 
engages a panoply of traditional leaderships, each with its own constituencies and 
assumed prerogatives” (Fleming, 2004: xv). Through the immense resource 
uncovered at Mari, it is possible to trace the communicative patterns between and 
across a broad spectrum of sites of power, many full of both opinion and advice as 
well as appeals for consensus (Fleming, 2004: 166, 228). In this way, collective forms 
of governance appear to have held some influence over the state and, reminiscent of 
both the myth of Enuma Elish and the Epic of Gilgamesh, “…they appear most 
prominently in decisions of war and peace” (Fleming, 2004: 223).  
 
The reason for Mari’s dispersed power structure was due to the fact that it was a 
rather loose collective of various nomadic, tribal and village peoples. This resulted in 
a number of sheikhs, chiefs, officials, elders, assemblies and governors who vied for 
power and influence under the authority of the king (Saggs, 2004: 191). Fleming 
studied in detail the small Mari towns of Tuttal, Imar and Urgish, concluding that 
collective forms of governance were most prominent in such small communities and 
that it is likely to have been this way since the third millennium BC (Fleming, 2004: 
223, 234). Although collective decision making appears to have occurred mostly in 
smaller groups of the elite, there were occasions where “…both the pastoralists of the 
steppe and the residents of towns did sometimes gather, not only to receive word from 
an outside king but even to speak for the group” (Fleming, 2004: 234). Ultimately, 
these antediluvian governmental systems evolved from simple tribal gatherings to 
incorporate decision-making aspects (Fleming, 2004: 207) and wield influence over 
the higher authority of the king. It is therefore conceivable that a king wanting to 
genuinely unite this heterogeneous region would encourage such collective decision 
making and accept the inherent challenges of a kingdom consisting of various systems 
and sites of power.  
 
Fleming, like Evans (see above discussion of Kanesh), is reluctant to use the 
nomenclature of democracy to describe the political machinations of the Mari. 
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Instead, he prefers the anthropological terminology of ‘corporate polity’ to explain the 
governance of Mari (and other ancient Mesopotamian empires and cities) (Fleming, 
2004: 174-180, 222-228) as opposed to ‘Primitive Democracy’ which has been used 
by (and since) Jacobsen (Jacobsen, 1970 [1943]). Essentially, Fleming’s reluctance 
stems from his concern that the term ‘democracy’ may serve as a “…barrier to 
understanding the diverse Near Eastern tradition of group-oriented decision making 
that may somehow stand behind the remarkable development of Athens” (Fleming, 
2004: 16). Beyond his concern over the loose application of the term ‘democracy’, 
Fleming also herein reveals that Greek democracy is not without precedent. While it 
is commonly assumed that ‘Western democracy’ arose triumphantly out of a dark 
history of despotic rule, cases such as the Mari and other Mesopotamian examples 
suggest a cross-section of egalitarian and collective traditions spread over the wider 
region that cannot have avoided impacting upon later developments.   
 
As M. A. Dandamayev has illustrated, these various Mesopotamian assemblies 
continued throughout much of the first millennium BC. Despite the fact that this era 
witnessed a number of violent and prolonged battles including the various wars 
between the Assyrian and Babylonian empires as well as the Persian and Macedonian 
conquests, the local assemblies maintained jurisdiction over many local disputes and 
crimes (Dandamayev, 1995: 23, 25). Here Dandamayev lists various examples of 
civil, legal, administrative, private and temple-related cases presided over by the 
popular assemblies. These cases included murder, theft, rent and tenancy issues, 
paternity cases, prison escape attempts, disputes between civil officials and temple 
administrators, debts, complex contractual arrangements, business arrangements, 
slave ownership and inheritance issues (Dandamayev, 1995: 25-26). As with earlier 
examples, these assemblies were made up of the free male population of the city who 
were both permanent residents and property owners, with the more esteemed citizens 
such as high-ranking officials, temple representatives and wealthy merchants playing 
a more dominant role (Dandamayev, 1995: 25-26, 28). Dandamayev also documents 
the last known reference to the ancient Mesopotamian tradition of ‘Primitive 
Democracy’. Here, in the city of Cutha (just north of Kish and Babylon), the temple 
assembly convened as late as 187 BC, effectively marking the known conclusion of 
almost 3,000 years of collective governance across the ancient Middle East. In 
concluding his paper on this particular era of Mesopotamian politics, Dandamayev 
states,     
On the whole, the Babylonian popular assemblies were stable bodies which 
outlived the empires of the Sumerian, Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian, and 
Macedonian kings. The final disappearance of the popular assemblies, perhaps 
at the beginning of the Christian era, marked both the loss of civil rights by the 
inhabitants of Babylonian cities and the end of ancient Mesopotamian 
tradition. (Dandamayev, 1995: 29) 
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Conclusion 
 
In a body of recent work, Eric Davis has argued that in order to build a robust and 
egalitarian democratic order in post-Saddam Iraq, there needs to be a significant 
campaign to revive Iraqi ‘Historical Memory’ (Davis, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). Here 
Davis defines ‘Historical Memory’ as “…the collective understanding that a specific 
group of people shares about past events which this group perceives as having shaped 
its current economic, cultural, social, and political status and identity” (Davis, 2005c: 
55). He goes on to argue that by isolating and reiterating moments from Iraq’s past 
which demonstrate democratic and egalitarian tendencies we “…might help to unite 
and inspire Iraq’s citizenry by emphasising broad political participation and respect 
for cultural diversity” (Davis, 2005c: 57). While Davis’ work certainly makes passing 
reference to the rich history of Mesopotamia, he has not significantly engaged Iraq’s 
‘Primitive Democracy’ as a tool which might contribute to the broader project of 
building historical and democratic memories in Iraq. It should be remembered here 
that ancient Mesopotamia is not a distant, unknown past to the Iraqi populace; it is 
instead a rich cultural motif which has been frequently appropriated and worked into 
political, educational, sociological and literary discourses which have long 
underpinned notions of national unity and cultural pride amongst the Iraqis (Al-
Musawi, 2006; Baram, 1991, 1994).  
 
It is precisely because of this familiarity with Iraq’s ancient Mesopotamian heritage 
that ‘Primitive Democracy’ could serve as such a powerful ‘Historical Memory’ in the 
process of building and legitimating democratic governance in Iraq. What this history 
reveals is that Iraq is far from antithetical to democratisation or somehow prone to 
despotism and autocracy. It is instead the home of some of the earliest forms of 
collective and egalitarian governance. Where modern Western democracies 
repeatedly invoke the much lauded advent of the British Parliament, the signing of the 
American Declaration of Independence, the events of the French Revolution, or recall 
with admiration the Athenian polis and Roman Republic, Iraqi citizens may well be 
able to engage ‘Primitive Democracy’ as their own indigenous example of democracy 
– an example which not only pre-dates the Western narrative but occurred at the very 
heart of the Middle East.  
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